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Bad Old LDP Power Politics
This is what US-based Japan scholar Brad Glosserman ar-
gues happened in Japan last December. “The government’s 
difficulties reflected the failure of its policies – for no rea-
son other than their inability to deal with problems – yet 
the prime minister called an election to get a mandate to 
press ahead with more of the same,” he writes. The prime 
minister’s very own explanation of why he called elections 
is even more to the (cynical) point. “The trick to staying in 
office for a long time is to hold repeated elections over short 
intervals. But you need to win those elections,” he said in 
early December. Yet Japan does not need “tricks,” but the 
kind of economic and structural reforms Abe promised 
two years ago. Calling snap elections as opposed to using 
the majorities the LDP already had in both chambers of the 
Japanese parliament to adopt the economic and structural 
reforms promised since 2012 is arguably an expression of 
political helplessness at best and incompetence at worst. 
 Indeed, the first thing Abe talked about after the elec-
tion victory was the LDP’s allegedly “cherished and 
decades-old wish” of revising Japan’s US-“imposed” con-
stitution, when constitutional revision is arguably the last 
thing Japan needs. “Imposed,” as the constitution was 
drafted by US occupying forces in 1946. Its revision – in 
order to make a “truly independent” country out of Japan 
After Japan’s snap Lower House elections called on December 14 by old – and 
now new – Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, it will hopefully be the former, but 
probably the latter. This is the very opposite of what Abe promised would 
happen after his two-year tenure, which included many missed opportunities 
to adopt badly needed economic reforms capable of leading the country 
back onto a path of sustainable economic growth. While the jury is still out 
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to attempts to boost the country’s defense profile and get rid of Japan’s 
constitutionally prescribed pacifism, his (very) nationalist and at times revisionist 
political track record suggests that it could be the latter yet again. 
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ever, the real non-starter on Tokyo’s policy agenda in the 
months and years ahead will most probably be Abe’s plan 
to revise the constitution.   
A Landslide Victory?  
At first sight, yes; looking a bit closer, not really. The LDP 
and its coalition partner, the Komeito, originally a pacifist 
party with ideological and financial roots in the Buddhist 
sect Soka Gakkai, won 326 seats, increasing its majority 
in the Lower House by one seat. At 326 seats in the Lower 
House (of 475 seats in total), that is nine seats more than 
once again, as Japanese revisionists and nationalists put 
it – has indeed been an officially declared LDP policy goal 
since the party was founded in 1955. “Cherished,” since 
this is what Abe and Japan’s like-minded nationalists and 
revisionists want, as opposed to the vast majority of the 
Japanese people. Speaking of like-minded: Gen Nakatani, 
a former (very) hawkish general of Japan’s Ground Self-
Defense Forces and newly appointed minister of defense, 
is very much in agreement with Abe on constitutional re-
vision. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, he thinks, is 
“out of touch with reality.” As will be shown below, how-
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3politics – the kind of apathy the LDP was able to count on 
from 1955 to 1993, when it governed Japan without inter-
ruption. “The absence of a credible alternative to the LDP 
made the electorate give up on political participation,” Mi-
ura says. Indeed, Japan’s main opposition party was caught 
in a state of complete disarray and, despite winning an ad-
ditional eleven seats in the Lower House and increasing its 
total from 62 to 73, the DPJ is only a shadow of its former 
self when it beat the LDP back in 2009.2 As a sign of its 
weakness, the DPJ was able to run candidates for only 60 
percent of the 295 available single-member seats. Japan’s 
opposition in general and the DPJ in particular were even 
too weak to exploit the fact that Abe’s economic policies 
produced two quarters of negative economic growth. De 
facto, that leaves Japan without real political opposition, 
recalling Japan’s bad old days as a “one-party democracy” 
when the LDP ruled the country from 1955 to 1993. It has 
been either that or what Gerald Curtis calls the “2014 sys-
tem,” i.e. a powerful prime minister and Prime Minister’s 
Office and a weak party and LDP factions, which have tra-
ditionally been very influential, taking turns nominating 
(and controlling) the country’s prime minister.
Reforms at Last?
A return to sustainable (as opposed to temporary) econom-
ic growth supported by quantitative easing on the part of 
the Japanese central bank should finally become part of To-
kyo’s agenda. Admittedly, that is easier said than done as 
Japan technically slipped back into recession late last year. 
Economic data published in October indicated that Japan’s 
GDP shrank by an annualized 7.1 percent in the second 
quarter of 2014. Data from November 17 are a little better 
(although not good), showing that the economy also con-
tracted an annualized 1.6 percent in the third quarter of 
2014. Furthermore, a rise in Japan’s consumption tax (i.e. 
value-added tax) in April led to a sharp drop in consumer 
spending and a retreat of inflation. Core inflation has fallen 
to below 1 percent since September 2014. While postpon-
needed for a 317-seat two-thirds majority, a so-called “su-
per-majority,” in the first chamber of Japan’s parliament 
(Figure 1). That enables the LDP-led coalition to nominate 
of all of the Lower House committee chairs while giving it 
a majority in every legislative committee. Furthermore, it 
enables the governing coalition to override legislative ve-
toes in the Upper House (or House of Councilors, the sec-
ond chamber of the parliament). At first sight this looks 
like the LDP has achieved a very impressive landslide 
victory over the main opposition party, the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ), which won just 73 seats. A closer 
look at the results, however, tells a slightly different story. 
Election data published by The Tokyo Shimbun show that 
the LDP won 75 percent of the seats in single-member 
districts with just 48 percent of the vote. That means the 
LDP won a greater number of seats with an ever shrink-
ing number of votes, i.e. it took 223 district races with 1.8 
million fewer votes than it received in 2009 (when it was 
defeated by the DPJ). 
 While the LDP-Komeito coalition won one overall ad-
ditional seat, the LDP alone lost four seats and now has 291 
representatives in the parliament’s first chamber (down 
from the 295 it had in 2012).1 Japan’s Communist Party 
(JCP) – roughly the Japanese equivalent of a European-
style “protest party” – increased the number of its seats 
in the Lower House from 8 to 21. While the JCP will not be 
able to influence day-to-day politics more than it was able 
to do with its eight seats, the increase is nonetheless note-
worthy as it is an expression of protest against LDP poli-
cies. What’s more, only slightly more than half of Japan’s 
electorate bothered to go to the polls. The turnout was just 
53.3 percent, compared to 60 percent in the 2012 elections 
when the LDP won its first landslide victory over the DPJ. 
While the low turnout benefited the LDP’s well-organized 
rural vote-gathering machines, it is also, as Mari Miura, 
professor of political science at Sophia University in Tokyo 
concludes in an interview with the Financial Times, the re-
sult of the electorate’s apathy towards and disillusion with 
1 Figure 1 shows the LDP holding 294 and not 295 seats, as the speaker of the Lower House, the Liberal-Democrat Bunmei Ibuki, 
 is not counted as a “normal” parliamentarian due to his officially non-partisan position.
2 Figure 1 shows the DPJ holding only 57 seats. From 2012 to 2014, the DPJ received five additional seats due to a reallocation 
 of parliamentary seats. The number of its seats in the Lower House increased from 57 to 62. 
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tion the TPP to farmers during the short election campaign, 
knowing that most of them are fervently opposed to the 
agreement, which will be accompanied by agricultural 
trade liberalization. And that, despite the fact that Japan’s 
entering the TPP in 2015 is a central part of Abe’s official 
economic policy agenda. To be sure, Japan’s farmers have 
no intentions whatsoever of giving up their privileges and 
seeing tariffs reduced on rice (amounting to a whopping 600 
percent on imported rice) and other agricultural products. 
 For now, it is back to what the LDP can do best: pump-
ing liquidity and borrowed money into the economy and 
markets, hoping that this will lead to sustainable economic 
growth. On December 27, Tokyo in fact approved yet an-
other economic stimulus package, worth 3.5 trillion yen 
($29 billion), aimed at supporting the country’s regions 
and households with subsidies and merchandise vouchers. 
While the package is aimed at boosting Japan’s GDP by 
0.7 percent, Tokyo will, in view of Japan’s very dire public 
finances, have to refrain from fresh debt issuance and in-
stead fund the package with unspent funds from previous 
budgets and tax revenues. Of the total, 1.8 trillion yen will 
be spent on support for small firms to revive the country’s 
regional economies and on the distribution of coupons, 
providing low-income households, among others, with sub-
sidies for fuel purchases. Leaving aside that Tokyo led by 
the LDP has adopted numerous similar stimulus pack-
ages over the years and indeed decades, judging by his 
two-year track record as prime minister, Abe could be 
tempted to continue relying on quantitative easing by the 
Bank of Japan (BoJ), as opposed to complementing mas-
sive monetary liquidity with reforms, as a basis for sus-
tainable economic growth.  
 Japan’s budget for fiscal 2015 is more of the same old 
same old. On January 14, Tokyo approved a record bud-
get of 96.34 trillion yen ($812 billion) for the fiscal year 
starting April 1. While the government says that Japan 
is on course for meeting the earlier promise of halving 
the primary budget deficit in the upcoming fiscal year (by 
cutting new borrowing for a third straight year), Tokyo’s 
ing a second consumption-tax increase until 2017 is ex-
pected to counter a further drop in domestic consumption, 
it also has a downside. The increase was meant to reduce 
the country’s enormous public debt, which amounts to a 
staggering 250 percent of GDP (Figure2).
 The government’s envisioned reforms include the issu-
ing of visas to foreign construction and healthcare work-
ers and the expansion of Japan’s childcare structures and 
facilities to enable more women to re-enter the workforce 
after childbirth. Compared to their counterparts in Europe 
and the US, far more Japanese women give up full-time 
jobs after the birth of their first child, and fewer go back to 
work full-time when their child reaches school age. Recent 
research suggests that if Japan were able to achieve the 
level of full-time female employment of Italy, for example, 
it could add 15 percent to its GDP. To increase female em-
ployment, Abe has announced a series of reforms dubbed 
“Womenomics.” These reforms include the provision by 
2020 of childcare centers sufficient for 300,000 children, 
the obligation for listed companies to disclose the number 
of female executives by March 2015 and revision of the tax 
and social security system to encourage women to re-enter 
the labor market when their children reach school age. Fur-
thermore, Abe has announced that by the end of the decade 
30 percent of all managers in Japanese companies should 
be women. The government has also announced plans to 
abolish the current spousal tax deduction system, which 
offers tax relief if the low-income spouse’s salary does not 
exceed 1 million yen a year. The current system has en-
couraged married women to stay out of the workforce, and 
the reform will offer tax deductions to the spouse with the 
higher annual income. With 14 million people currently 
covered by the system, the potential boost to the nation’s 
workforce could be significant. 
 And then there are Japan’s ambitions to join the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), the regional free-trade agree-
ment involving Japan, the United States, Australia and 
nine other countries. While Japan’s TPP entry is, as the 
prime minister puts it, “imminent,” he chose not to men-
5The Economic Good News … 
Not all is bleak, however. Indeed, some economic indicators 
could play to the government’s advantage in the months 
ahead. Japan’s labor market has become tighter, and the 
yen has fallen sharply against the US dollar over the last 
two years (by roughly 45 percent), in turn increasing the 
competitiveness of Japanese exports. Last October, the BoJ 
resumed its massive asset purchase program (i.e. quanti-
tative easing), amounting to a total of around 15 percent of 
Japan’s GDP per year. That is roughly $700 billion worth 
of government bonds meant to help achieve the targeted 
inflation rate of 2 percent. While the BoJ’s asset purchase 
program has kept Japan from falling back into deflation, it 
has failed to achieve the targeted rate of inflation, which 
currently stands at 0.7 percent. As a consequence of the 
BoJ’s provision of massive liquidity and because of the 
cheaper yen, some major Japanese companies have begun 
re-shoring, investing in new plants in Japan. Furukawa 
Electric and the industrial groups Toray and Daikin are al-
strategy to reduce the country’s primary budget could turn 
out to be unsustainable. Japan’s fiscal consolidation, econ-
omists fear, relies too much (read: exclusively) on growth 
to cover rising spending, as opposed to measures for re-
straining spending. Japan’s defense budget in 2015 will 
rise to 4.98 trillion yen (roughly $42.7 billion), up about 
100 billion yen from the last fiscal year. The largest budget 
item, however, is social welfare spending, which is set to 
rise by 1 trillion yen to 31.53 trillion yen. While Japan’s 
stock markets have soared over the last two years and the 
property markets in Tokyo and other big Japanese cities 
have become very dynamic, household incomes have not 
kept pace with rising prices. Indeed, ordinary Japanese 
citizens were confronted with a rise in the consumption 
tax and – due to the weaker yen – higher energy and fuel 
costs. Consequently, Japan’s national poverty rate is the 
highest in the country’s post-war history, with over 2 mil-
lion people receiving welfare.
Figure 2: Macroeconomic indicators 2010 – 2015
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014
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decision in July 2014, Abe has already tested and indeed 
reached the limits in terms of deployment of Japanese 
troops acceptable to the Komeito. Back then, the LDP and 
Komeito agreed to try to adopt the necessary legislation that 
would allow Japan’s armed forces to execute the right to 
collective self-defense when defending Japanese territory 
against an outside attack. Until now, Article 9 – which 
strictly speaking does not even allow Japan to have armed 
forces in the first place – denies the country this right as 
formulated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the right to 
militarily defend other countries’ soldiers in joint military 
operations. Allowing Japanese soldiers to jointly defend 
Japanese territory (together with the 50,000 US soldiers 
stationed on Japanese soil) in the case of an attack on Ja-
pan was the most the Komeito agreed to last July. To be 
sure, this was significantly less than what Abe initially 
had in mind. He wanted to re-interpret the war-renouncing 
Article 9 to allow the country’s armed forces to execute 
the right to collective self-defense in the context of inter-
national UN-sponsored peacekeeping and even peace-
enforcement missions. 
 In order to actually authorize Japan’s armed forces to 
execute the right to collective self-defense, the govern-
ment will have to adopt roughly 15 so-called Basic Laws. 
While Abe also wants to adopt laws (submission of the 
bills to the parliament is scheduled for the end of January) 
that would allow Japan’s military this possibility, for ex-
ample in the context of UN-mandated military operations, 
Komeito will continue to insist that Japanese soldiers will 
only be allowed to execute this right when jointly defend-
ing Japanese territory with US military personnel stationed 
in Japan. With the Komeito as the only possible coalition 
partner – since there is no one else the LDP can turn to, 
as a number of right-wing parties and potential coalition 
partners have been voted out of parliament – Abe will 
most probably not get his way on constitutional re-inter-
pretation beyond what was agreed on with the Komeito 
last year. What’s more, adopting the Basic Laws could take 
months or even years and the re-interpretation of Article 
ready building new factories in Japan, and Japanese car-
maker Toyota could follow suit in 2015. 
… But Japan Inc. Not Helping
Tokyo, economists argue, must continue putting pressure 
on companies to increase wages in order to ensure that 
salaries keep up with rising prices. Japan’s main blue 
chip companies, however, are unwilling to do just that, at 
least for now. In fact, according to a Reuters survey pub-
lished on December 15, Japanese firms plan to return their 
excess cash to shareholders next year instead of spend-
ing it on raises for employees. Real wages in Japan have 
been falling over the last 18 months and Abe’s economic 
stimulus packages can only boost domestic consumption 
if they are accompanied by an increase in salaries. Only 
one in 10 companies, the survey shows, is planning to 
raise wages, while more than 70 percent said they would 
spend cash reserves on dividends for investors and share 
buybacks, with most of these also prioritizing invest-
ment over salary increases. The pay freeze, however, is 
becoming increasingly unjustifiable as Japan’s companies 
are holding cash equivalent to more than 60 percent of 
Japan’s GDP. To sweeten the government-corporate deal 
of raising salaries, in January Abe confirmed his commit-
ment to further cutting corporate tax rates. 
The Wrong Priorities Again?
The urgency to adopt economic reforms aside, Abe could 
again be tempted to focus on his own personal, as opposed 
to the country’s, interests: boosting Japan’s military profile 
and attempting to revise its war-renouncing constitution. 
Indeed, at the very end of last December, Abe announced 
he would again submit a permanent law authorizing the 
deployment of troops overseas in the context of UN-spon-
sored international military missions. Such a law would 
replace the past practice of ad-hoc legislation each time 
Japanese Self-Defense Forces were deployed abroad (except 
in the case of UN peacekeeping operations, for which Ja-
pan adopted a law in 1992).  However, following a cabinet 
7at the helm of his party, his position as LDP party presi-
dent could be challenged in the run-up to the LDP party 
presidency elections in September 2015 – if his economic 
policies centered around “Abenomics” (hyper-easy mone-
tary policy, government spending and deregulation) do not 
pull Japan out of recession and if there is no breakthrough 
in Japanese-US negotiations on Japan’s TPP entry. 
 The Prime Minister has to decide in the months ahead 
whether to restart another two nuclear reactors. While two 
reactors at the Sendai plant in Satsumasendai in Kagoshi-
ma prefecture have received a green light from Japan’s 
nuclear regulator, two additional reactors in Fukui pre-
fecture could get the go-ahead soon. The Japanese public 
is opposed to re-starting the country’s nuclear reactors, 
but if the December 2014 elections are anything to go by, 
Abe might pull another one of his “tricks” and decide on 
the reactors’ restart after the local elections scheduled na-
tionwide in April.
9 is not, as is sometimes feared in Beijing and Seoul, the 
beginning of the re-emergence of Japanese militarism. In 
fact, it is evident that Tokyo’s security and defense poli-
cies will continue to be defined and restrained by its war-
renouncing constitution. 
 To be sure, Abe hasn’t given up on “full-fledged” consti-
tutional revision just yet and has suggested establishing 
a bipartisan seven-party working group to discuss further 
constitutional re-interpretation and revision. However, that 
is a proposal by a prime minister for whom constitutional 
revision is a near-obsession, as opposed to a policy agenda 
item shared by Abe’s political friends and foes, let alone 
by a majority of the Japanese electorate. Indeed, investing 
resources and political capital to try to revise something 
that is as good as impossible to revise is arguably a waste 
of time and resources. The procedural and political ob-
stacles for constitutional revision – a two-thirds majority 
in both chambers of the Japanese parliament followed by 
a national referendum – will remain in place, since Abe’s 
earlier initiatives to lower the barriers for constitutional 
revision have gone nowhere so far. 
Conclusions
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s strategy to call snap elections 
and take advantage of an incredibly weak political opposi-
tion paid off, even if the election victory is less stunning 
than the raw numbers indicate. Tokyo’s policy agenda in 
the months ahead is, as shown above, very full, but unless 
Prime Minister Abe changes gear and adopts more of the 
long-announced economic, structural and fiscal reforms, 
there could be (many) more very half-hearted reform poli-
cies in the months ahead. For now, Abe’s efforts to resume 
and expand constitutional re-interpretation together with 
the adoption of very familiar LDP-style economic stimulus 
packages provide initial evidence that we will have to live 
with “more of the same” as opposed to “something new” 
as far as Tokyo’s economic reform policies are concerned. 
The election victory gave Abe a mandate to govern Japan 
until 2018, at least in theory. While Abe seems to be firmly 
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